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UNEXPECTED ECONOIW:C LOSS FROM YIELD VARIATION AND 
FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE 
Multiple Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI) and Group Risk Plan (GRP) use yield (i.e., physical) 
loss to determine who collects. However, insurance is bought to protect against economic 
loss resulting from physical loss. This study analyzes unexpected economic loss resulting 
from yield variation. It also compares unexpected economic loss with simulated MPCI and 
GRP collections for a sample of Ohio farm operators. Analysis reveals: (1) GRP's payout 
structure is further removed from unexpected economic loss than MPCI's, (2) MPCI 
collections exceed the associated unexpected economic loss in a free market, and (3) MPCI 
collections more closely match unexpected loss when farm programs exist. 
UNEXPECTED ECONOMIC LOSS FROM YIElD VARIATION AND 
FEDERAL CROP INSURANCE 
Collections under existing federal crop insurance programs are determined by 
yidd (i.e., physical) loss. However, insurance is an economic good bought to protect 
against the economic loss which results from physical loss, not against physical loss m 
.K (Wi11iams, ~ al., p. 107). This distinction between economic and physical loss 
becomes critical in a competitive market where physical loss can be widespread. The 
largest cause of crop loss in the U.S. is drought (U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), 1992, p. 398). Drought usually affects a large geographical area at one time. 
Thus, economic loss associated with yield loss for an individual operator is often a 
function of not only the individual operator's yield loss, but also the change in market 
price engendered by a concurrent wide-spread natural phenomenon. 
This study examines the unexpected economic loss associated with yield variation. 
Models of unexpected economic loss associated with yield variation are derived (1) for a 
market situation in which there are no public price and income support programs 
(hereafter, referred to as the free market scenario) and (2) for a market situation in which 
the government provides farm income deficiency payments and price support loans 
(hereafter, referred to as the farm program scenario). Data from a random sample of 
Ohio farm operators for 1986, 1987, 1988, and 1990 are used to calculate unexpected 
economic losses (and gains) resulting from yield variation in com under both scenarios. 
The unexpected economic losses are compared with insurance collections simulated in 
accordance with Federal Multiple Peril Crop Insurance and Group (i.e., area) Risk Plan. 
Conclusions, implications, and suggestions for future research end the paper. 
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UNEXPBC'IED EcoNoMIC Loss MODELS 
A farm operator decides to plant a crop based on expected revenues. If Jaliu:d 
revenue is less (greater) than expected revenue, the farm operator experiences an 
unexpected economic loss (gain). Characteristics of unexpected economic loss resulting 
from variatioo in yield are modeled for U.S. field crops. The model is developed 
initially for a free market. Then, the impact of government price and income supports is 
evaluated. 
Free Market 
In a free market, a farm operator's gross revenue expected at the time the crop is 
planted1 equals: 
(1) 
where: GR1\ = Expected Gross Return for Farm Operator i 
pe m = Expected Market Price at Harvest1 
yei = Expected Average Yield per Acre 
Aei = Expected Harvested Acres 
Actual reaH:rations of the above variables are denoted by dropping the superscript e (e.g., 
realized gross return is represented as GRJ. Assuming expected cost equals J'f')lliu:d 
cost, a farm operator is better off than expected at planting if GRei < G~. 
The focus of this analysis is the change in gross revenue from that expected at 
planting when rea1iud yield differs from expected yield. Therefore, assume that reaHred 
harvested acreage equals expected harvested acreage. Consequently, whether a farm 
operator realizes an unexpected economic loss or gain, i.e., is worse or better off than 
expected at planting, can be detennined as follows: 
( 2) p• • y• > p • y 
• I < • I 
H both reaJized price and yield exceed (are less than) expected price and yield, 
then the farm operator's gross revenue is unexpectedly higher (lower). The direction of 
change in gross revenue is uncertain when, relative to their expected values, realized 
price and yield move in opposite directions. This situation can be examined by 
reformulating equation 2 in terms of percentage change: 
( 3 ) %aP"' ~ %AY, 
where: %AP"' • (P.- P~) I [ (P,.-+ P~) I 2] 
%AY, • (Yi - Y,e) I [ (Y1 -+ Y,e} I 2) 
Most crops are produced in a competitive market where individual farm operators 
can not influence the market price at harvest and, therefore, are a price takers. Thus, 
ignoring price differences caused by spatial factors, all operators receive the same price. 
Market price can change due to a variety of supply and demand considerations. 
Because this study focuses on the consequences of yield variation upon unexpected 
economic loss or gain, it is necessary to identify the change in market price which is 
solely due to a change in yield. Therefore, assume that the market demand curve is a 
constant elasticity of substitution function and remains constant between planting and 
harvest, that national harvested acres do not differ from expected, and that imports are 
negligible. Given these assumptions, market price changes only when the supply curve 
shifts along the demand curve in response to changes in national average yield. 
Magnitude of the price change is a function of the elasticity of demand and the 
change in national average yield (i.e., supply curve shift). Specifically, 
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(4) tAP. • (1 I eD) • t4YN 
where: eD • Elasticity of Demand 
Y N • Average National Yield 
t4YN • (YN- Y;) I [ (YN + Y;) I 2] 
Since the elasticity of demand is negative, market price increases (decreases) if national 
yield declines (increases) relative to its expected value at planting. 
(5) 
Substituting equation 4 into equation 3 results in: 
> 
< 
Examination of this equation reveals that in a free market a decline in a farm 
operator's yield between planting and harvest translates into an unexpected economic loss 
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only if the percentage decline in the operator's yield is greater than the percentage decline 
in the national yield adjusted for the demand price flexibility (i.e., one over the elasticity 
of demand). Therefore, a farm operator with an unexpected physical loss (i.e., decline in 
yield relative to expected) does not necessarily suffer an unexpected economic loss (i.e., 
decline in gross revenue relative to expected). Furthermore, a farm operator whose 
reaJjzed yield exceeds expected yield also can suffer an unexpected economic loss if the 
percentage increase in his/her yield is less than the percentage increase in the national 
yield adjusted for the demand price flexibility. 
If the talized and expected national yields are the same, %.A Y N in equation 5 
equals zero. Only in this situation will unexpected economic loss depend solely on the 
unexpected yield loss of the individual farm operator. 
Farm Price and Income Sup,port Pmmm 
For cotton, feed grains, rice, and wheat the government provides price supports 
via nomecourse loans and income support via deficiency payments. Nonrecourse loans 
s 
establish a floor on market price. Deficiency payments establish a minimum revenue per 
bushel (i.e., target price) for eligible crops. To establish eligibility, a specified percent 
of land must be set aside (i.e., not planted). 
Abstracting away from payment limits, gross income for farm operator i at 
planting time for an acre of planted land enrolled in farm price and income support 
programs during the years examined in this study equalled2 (USDA, 1990): 
(6) GRC = MAX~ Ill' LR) • yi + MAX[O, TP - MAX(LR, DPpc)] • ppyi 
where: GRc 
LR 
TP 
nppc 
ppyi 
= Expected Gross Return per Acre of Planted Land in Farm Program 
=Loan Rate 
= Target Price 
= Deficiency Payment Price 
= Program Payment Yield 
Maximum per bushel deficiency payment is the difference between the target 
price and nonrecourse loan rate. The loan rate, target price, and operator's program 
payment yield are known at planting time. 
For a producer participating in the farm program, unexpected economic loss 
(gain) from yield variation must include the resulting unexpected changes in deficiency 
payments between planting and harvest and the effect of the nonrecourse loan rate on 
price received. To illustrate the implication of this observation, assume expected market 
price is greater than the loan rate but less than the target price. Also assume that a farm 
operator's expected yield and program payment yield are equal and that changes in 
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market price and deficiency payment price are perfectly positively correlated. Therefore, 
unexpected changes in market price and deficiency payment caused by unexpected 
changes in national yield completely offset each other. Consequently, the operator's 
unexpected economic loss is a function only of unexpected change in his/her yield. 
While these assumptions will not hold in the real world, it is reasonable to expect that the 
effect of an unexpected change in national yield upon market price can be offset at least 
partially by an opposite unexpected change in deficiency payment. Consequently, 
unexpected economic loss from yield variation can differ significantly between the free 
market and farm program scenarios3• 
P.AllAMEIERIZA'IION OF UNEXPECTED EcoNOMIC Loss CALCULA'D:ONS 
Analysis of a farm operator's unexpected economic loss associated with yield 
variation requires the measurement of expected and mtlired values for individual farm 
operator yield and national yield. In addition, the relationship between changes in 
national yield and changes in market price needs to be identified. The specific crop for 
which these variables and relationship are identified is com. 
Individual Farm Operator Yields 
Individual farm operator yields are taken from the Ohio Farm Household 
Longitudinal Survey. Data from this survey exist for 1986, 1987, 1988, and 1990 (no 
survey exists for 1989). The survey collected data from a randomly selected sample of 
approximately 1,000 Ohio farm operator households during the spring of the following 
calendar year. Some households included in the 1987, 1988, and 1990 surveys 
participated in earlier samples; other households were teplacements. 
ODe hundred eighteen farm operators reported com yields for 1986, 1987, 1988, 
and 1990. During the 1990 survey they also reported com program payment yield for 
1991 and expected 1991 com yield:' These 118 farm operators comprise the sample 
analyzed in this investigation. 
Program payment yields have been frozen at 1986 levels since passage of the 
Food Security .A.a of 1985. Thus, the farm operator's com program payment yield for 
1991 is used for the 1986, 1987, 1988, and 1990 crops. Expected yield is available only 
for 1991. To account for technological change, this yield is adjusted to earlier years by 
using the trend in average expected Ohio yields over the period of analysis. Average 
expected Ohio yield for 1986, 1987, 1988, 1990 and 1991 is calculated as the average of 
Ohio yields for the five previous crop years minus high and low yields. The ratio 
between the estimated Ohio expected yields for an earlier year and 1991 is multiplied by 
the individual farm operator's 1991 expected yield to create an adjusted expected yield 
for the earlier year. For example, using this procedure the 1986 Ohio expected yield is 
8.7 percent less than the 1991 Ohio expected yield. Accordingly, each farm operator's 
1991 expected yield is reduced by 8.7 percent to derive the operator's expected yield for 
1986. 
NarinnaJ 'field and Market Price 
Rallimf U.S. yield is the yield reported in USDA's November crop production 
report. The November report occurs during the peak of com harvest in the U.S. and 
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Obio. The yields are 119.3, 120.3, 82.3 and 119.0 bushels per aae for 1986, 1987, 
1988, and 1990, respectively. 
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Expected U.S. yield at planting for 1986, 1987, 1988, and 1990 is calculated as 
the moving average of national yields for the five previous crops minus high and low 
y.ieldr. This estimator generates national expected harvest yields of 109.6, 112.6, 114.7, 
and 117.9 bushels per acre, respectively. Therefore, realized national yield differs from 
expected national yield by 9.7, 7.7, -32.4, and 1.1 bushels per acre for 1986, 1987, 
1988, and 1990, respectively. 
Expected Ohio harvest price equals the December com futures price on April! 
minus the average Ohio com basis during the five previous crop harvest periods. The 
basis for a given year is the average of the basis for all Tuesdays between October 15 and 
November 15, which is the period of peak com harvest in Ohio. The basis equals the 
closing Chicago Board of Trade December futures prices minus average Ohio cash price. 
In summary, this procedure generated expected harvest-time cash com prices of $1.84 in 
1986, $1.55 in 1987, $2.04 in 1988, and $2.42 in 1990. 
Because the planting season in Ohio begins approximately Apri115, April I falls 
late in the planted acreage decision. Thus, the chance that planted, hence harvested 
acreage will vary from expectations is minimized by using this date. 
Futures prices for com are obtained from a computer database compiled by 
Technical Tools. Cash prices are obtained from the Ohio Department of Agriculture. 
The relationship between the change in U.S. yield between planting and harvest 
and the corresponding change in the value of com is derived by regressing the percentage 
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change in the December com futures price from May 15 to November 15 on the 
percentage change from expected values over this period for the following market factors: 
new crop yield, new crop harvested acres, and stocks carried into the new crop year'. 
May is the earliest month for which new crop supply and demand estimates are 
consistently available from USDA's World Supply and Demand Estimates. As previously 
mentioned, the November report occurs during the peak of com harvest in the U.S. and 
Ohio. 
Percentage change in U.S. yield is calculated using the previously discussed 
expected and harvested yields. Percentage change in new crop carryin stocks is 
calculated using the values reported in the May and November World Supply and Demand 
Estimates. Percentage change in harvested acreage is calculated using the estimated 
planted acreage in the May report and harvested acreage reported in the November 
report. The estimated planted acreage reported in May is adjusted to an estimated 
harvested acreage by using a historical five year moving average of the ratio between 
harvested and planted acres. 
The first year that estimates for new crop supply and demand are available in 
May is 1974. Using only data from previous years, the regression results for each year 
are: 
(7) 1986: 
1987: 
1988: 
1990: 
%41'. = -0.01 -0.78 %AYN + 2.14 %Meres- .35 %4stocks 
%41'. - -0.01 -0.80 %4YN + 2.20 %AAcres- .34 %4sfocks 
%41'. = -0.02 -0.80 %AYN + 2.28 %Meres- .32 %4stocks 
%41'. = -0.02 - 0.82 %AYN + 2.18 %Meres- .32 %4stoclcs 
All four yield coefficients are significant at the one percent level. R2 for the 1986, 1987, 
aad 1988 regressions is 0. 74, while R2 for the 1990 regression is 0. 76. The price change 
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c:oef:ficient is approximately -o. 8 for all four regressions. This coefficient implies that a 
one percentage increase (decrease) in national yield relative to that expected at planting is 
associated with a 0.8 percentage decrease (increase) in the December com futu.tes price 
between May 15 and November 15'. 
Percentage change in U.S. yield between planting and harvest, the December com 
futures price at planting, and the estimated price change coefficient can be used to solve 
for the harvest-time value of the December com futures contract associated with the 
change in national yield. An Ohio value is derived by subtracting the average Ohio com 
basis during the five previous harvests8• This procedure generates the following yield-
adjusted value of Ohio com at harvest: $1.70, $1.46, $2.72, and $2.40 for 1986, 1987, 
1988, and 1990, respectively. These yield adjusted values differ by -14, -9, 68, and -2 
cents, respectively, from their expected values at planting. 
Per Bush.el Deficiency Payment Ca1culations 
Expected per bushel deficiency payment at planting equals the target price for the 
specific year minus the higher of that year's (1) nonrecourse loan rate or (2) the expected 
average U.S. cash price over the first five months of the com marketing year (i.e., 
expected deficiency payment price for com). This expected price is estimated as: 
(December com futures price on April 1) minus (average difference for the five previous 
years between the December com futures price on November 15 and average U.S. cash 
com price from September through January). Using this procedure, per bushel 
deficiency payment expected at planting is $1.11 in 1986, $1.21 in 1987, $0.91 in 1988, 
and $0.33 in 1990. 
11 
Tbe cash price used to determine the deficiency payment expected at harvest after 
adjusting for changes between expected and realized national yield equals: (value of the 
December futures contract associated with the change in national yield between planting 
and harvest) minus (average difference for the five previous crop years between the 
December com futures price on November 15 and the average U.S. cash price for the 
September - January period). This procedure generates the following per bushel 
deficiency payments expected at harvest: $1.11 in 1986, $1.21 in 1987, $0.23 in 1988, 
and $0.36 in 1990. 
RFsl:JLTS FOR UNEXPECIED EcoNOMIC Loss ANALYSIS FROM YIEU> V AIUADON 
Due to favorable weather, realized yield exceeded expected yield in 1986 for 91 
percent of the 118 Ohio farm operators examined in this study (Table 1). In contrast, 
drought during 1988 resulted in 69 percent of the operators having a realized yield which 
was at least 25 percent below expected yield. In 1987, rea1ized yield is slightly skewed 
toward being greater than expected yield, while the opposite is true in 1990. 
Consistent with the conceptual model, the distributions of percent unexpected 
change in an individual farm operator yield (actual yield divided by expected yield) and 
the corresponding percent unexpected change in gross return (gross return after adjusting 
for farm operator and national yield changes divided by expected gross return) differ 
substantially in the free market scenario. In 1988, only 37 percent of the farm operators 
had an unexpected economic loss greater than 25 percent in the free market scenario 
(Table 2). This share is 32 percentage points less than the share of fann operators who 
had a yield loss greater than 25 percent. The difference occurs because a national 
drought caused ~a~Uzed national yield to be 28 percent below expected national yield. 
Therefore, the value of a bushel of com increased to reflect the smaUe:r supply. 
In 1986 and 1987, a nine and seven percent increase in national yield relative to 
that expected at planting meant the opposite situation OCCUIIed in the free market. Nine 
and forty-two percent of farm operators bad a reali'red yield which was lower than the 
expected yield in 1986 and 1987, respectively. In contrast, 20 and 64 percent of the 
operators experienced an unexpected economic loss in 1986 and 1987, respectively. 
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In 1990, the distributions for unexpected yield change and unexpected change in 
gross revenue are almost identical in the free market scenario because ~a~lized and 
expected national yield are nearly identical (119.0 vs 117.9 bushels per acre). Thus, as 
expected in this situation, unexpected economic loss (gain) is predominately a function of 
unexpected change in the individual farm operator's yield. 
Except for 1990, when realiud and expected national yield were almost identical, 
the distribution of percent unexpected economic loss differed between the farm program 
and free market scenarios. The greatest difference occurred in 1988 when ~a~liud 
national yield differed substantially from expected. Sixty-two percent of farm operators 
in the farm program scenario had an unexpected economic loss which exceeded 25 
percent. The comparable share of farm operators in the free market scenario was 37 
percent. This difference reflects an unexpected decline in defieieney payments of $0.68 
per bushel in response to the lower national yield caused by the drought. 
During 1988, the distribution of unexpected economic change in the farm program 
scenario closely mirrored the distribution of unexpected changes in the individual farm 
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operator yields (fables 1 and 2). This similarity occurred because the unexpected 
changes in market value and deficiency payment due to an unexpected decline in national 
yield largely offset one another. Differences still occurred because a farm operator's 
com program payment yield differed from expected and actual yiel(i9. 
In conclusion, in the free market scenario substantive differences can exist 
between the percent unexpected change in an individual farm operator's yield and the 
associated unexpected economic loss or gain caused by yield variation. This difference 
occurs because unexpected change in gross revenue incmporates the unexpected variation 
in both the individual farm operator's yield and the unexpected contemporaneous 
variation in national average yield. Hence, unexpected economic change associated with 
yield variation contains within its calculation the market-wide risk factor of an unexpected 
change in national yield. Inclusion of this systematic factor raises the potential for 
significant implications for crop insurance because insurance is bought to protect against 
the economic loss resulting from yield loss, not against yield loss ~ g. 
Unexpected economic loss also can differ substantially between the free market 
and government program scenarios. This finding suggests that insurance programs which 
recognize this difference might be desirable. 
CROP INSuRANCE SIMULATIONS 
The implications for crop insurance are investigated by comparing the simulated 
collections under current federal crop insurance programs with the associated unexpected 
economic loss. Current programs are Multi-Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI) and the Group 
Risk Program (GRP). MPCI, which was first offered in 1938, covers most major field 
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crops for unavoidable production losses caused by drought, bail, flood, and other natural 
disasters. A pilot project for GRP was initiated in 1993 for soybeans in selected counties 
and states. 'Ibis pilot project will be expanded in 1994 to other crops and areas. GRP is 
based on county yields, not individual farm operator yields. Thus, it provides insw:ance 
against widespread loss of production in a county. 
Collections Under Multiple Peril Crqp Insurance 
Under MPCI, a farm operator collects if actual yield for the year falls below 
guaranteed yield. Guaranteed yield equals (Lovell and Smith, p. 1): 
(8) MPCI Guaranteed Yield = APR Yield • Coverage Level 
where: APH Yield =Estimate of farm operator's 10 year average yield10 
Coverage Level = Choice of 35, 50, 65, and 75 percent 
If actual yield is less than the guaranteed yield, collection under MPCI equals: 
(9) MPCI Collection = (Guaranteed Yield - Actual Yield) • Payment Price 
where: Payment Price = Choice between 30 and 100 percent of MPCI established price 
or MPCI announced market price, whichever is greater (Cross and Ctme, p. 3). 
Collections Under Group Risk Plan 
Under the soybean GRP, collections occur if the county's actual yield falls below 
the county's trigger yield. County trigger yield equals (USDA, 1992, p. 9): 
(10) GRP Trigger Yield = Coverage Level • Expected County Yield 
where: Coverage Levd =Choice of 65, 70, 75, 80, 85, or 90 Percent 
Expected County Yteld = Average of historical county yields adjusted for 
advances in technology (Skees,~ al., p. 17). 
If the realiud county yield is below the trigger yield, the following amount is collected 
per covered acre (Sees, ~ 11., p. 8): 
(11) GRP Collection = [(I'rigger County Yleld- Actual County Yld.d) I Trigger 
County Yield] • Protection Level 
where: Protection Level = Choice between 30 and 100 percent of maximum protection 
per acre for the county (USDA, 1992, p. 9). Maximum protection is 150 
percent of average county revenue per acre. 
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The 1993 format of the GRP program for soybeans is used for com. Coverage 
levels for MPCI and GRP are specified as 75 and 90 percent, respectively. These are the 
highest level currently available for each. The use of a higher coverage level for GRP 
reflects its lower level of adverse selection (Miranda). 
The farm operator's expected yield for a year is used as the APH yield since 
actual APH yields are not available. This decision enhances comparability between 
MPCI insurance collection and unexpected economic loss. Also for comparability 
reasons, expected harvest cash price on Aprill is used as the MPCI payment price. 
Expected county yield for each year is calculated as a moving average of the 
county's yields for the previous five years after eliminating the high and low yields. This 
procedure is the same one used for calculating expected U.S. and Ohio yields. 
The GRP protection level selected for each year is defined as the expected harvest 
cash price on April 1 times expected yield. Thus, the protection level equalled the farm 
operator's expected gross revenue for the crop year. 
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REsuLTS FOR INsullANCE COILECIION ANALYSIS 
Over all four years, 20 percent of the observations resulted in MPCI insurance 
being collected at the 25 percent deductible level. Because eligibility for collecting under 
MPCI depends on the ratio between re1lired and expected yield, this proportion can be 
derived directly from Table 1. Eighty-eight percent of MPCI collections occurred during 
the drought year of 1988. 
Under GRP, 28 percent of the observations resulted in insurance being collected at 
the 10 percent deductible level. All118 farm operators collected in 1988. In other 
words, the 1988 realized average yields for all Ohio counties represented in this study 
were at least 10 percent below their expected yields. 
Of the 93 times MPCI insurance is collected in the free market scenario, 41 
percent are associated with an unexpected economic loss which is less than 25 percent 
(Table 3). Average insurance collected in these 38 situations is $25.79 per acre even 
though unexpected economic loss is less than 25 percent. Furthermore, when both MPCI 
insurance is collected and unexpected economic loss exceeds 25 percent, average 
insurance collected is $27.54 per acre higher than the unexpected economic loss which 
exceeds 25 percent. These two results imply that, in the free market scenario, collections 
under MPCI exceed the associated unexpected economic loss. 
Turning to GRP insurance, 15 percent of the 339 observations in which GRP 
insurance is not collected in the free market scenario had an unexpected economic loss 
greater than 10 percent. For these 51 observations, average unexpected loss greater than 
10 percent is $21.26 per acre. The comparable numbers for MPCI at the 25 percent 
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deductible are two percent and $4.63 per acre. These results suggest that GRP is more 
prone than MPCI to the occurrence of situations in the free market where insurance is not 
collected even though unexpected economic loss exceeds the insurance deductible. 
Differences between insurance collections and unexpected economic loss are 
gene:rally smaller in the farm program scenario for both MPCI and GRP. In general, 
GRP results in more discrepancy in the farm program scenario between unexpected 
economic loss and insurance collections than does MPCI. 
To further examine the implications for crop insurance, an actuarial breakeven 
cost of MPCI and GRP is determined by dividing the total dollar amount collected by the 
total number of insurance observations (i.e. , 4 72). Thus, all farm operators are assumed 
to purchase insurance each year. 
Comparable calculations are made for the unexpected economic loss resulting from 
yield variation. Specifically, once unexpected economic loss exceeds 10 (25) percent of 
expected gross revenue at planting, an amount is collected equal to the unexpected 
economic loss in excess of the deductible. Hereafter, these calculations will be referred 
to as yield revenue insurance. 
Annual breakeven premium for MPCI, ignoring administration costs, is $9.84 per 
acre with a 25 percent deductible (Table 4). Annual breakeven premium for GRP is 
$15.60 per acre with a 10 percent deductible. At a 25 percent deductible, GRP's cost is 
$6.21 per acre. The lower cost for GRP than MPCI at the same deductible is consistent 
with Miranda's arguments that adverse selection is lower in a county yield program. 
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Under the free market scenario, breakeven cost for yield revenue insurance with a 
25 percent deductible is 48 percent less than the comparable brealceven cost for MPCI. 
Furthermore, the breakeven cost for yield revenue insurance with a 25 percent deductible 
is also smaller than the breakeven cost for GRP with a 25 percent deductible in the free 
market scenario. 
When farm programs are considered, the actuarial breakeven costs for yield 
revenue insurance is $10.56 with a 25 percent deductible11 • This break:even costs is 
slightly higher than the break:even cost for MPCI with a 25 percent deductible, but 
smaller than the breakeven cost for GRP with a 10 percent deductible. The comparable 
cost for MPCI and yield revenue insurance reflects the relatively close match between 
MPCI collections and unexpected economic loss in the farm program scenario. 
Except for GRP at the 10 percent deductible in the free market scenario, all 
insurance programs reduce the variability of realized gross income compared to the no 
insurance situation (Table 4). The standard deviation associated with GRP insurance is at 
least 10 percent higher than the standard deviation associated with MPCI and yield 
revenue insurance. MPCI and yield revenue insurance have similar standard deviations. 
Without insurance, gross income is more variable when farm price and income 
support programs exist than when farm programs do not exist. However, with all three 
types of insurance, variability is lower in the farm program scenario than in the free 
market scenario at the 10 percent deductible. Variability is similar between the two 
scenarios at the 25 percent deductible. Thus, insurance is relatively more important in 
stabilizing gross income when farm price and income support programs existl2• 
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SU'MMA:R.Y, CONCUJSIONS, AND IMPuCAnONS 
Collections under current federal crop insurance programs are based on yield loss, 
but insurance is an economic good purchased to protect against the unexpected economic 
loss which results from physical loss, not against physical loss J2er ~- A conceptual 
model reveals that substantive differences can exist between the deviation in an individual 
farm operator's yield from that expected at planting and the associated unexpected 
economic loss or gain in a market without farm price and income support programs (i.e., 
free market). The difference arises because an individual farm operator's yield loss or 
gain is often part of a wide-spread natural disaster or good weather. Thus, unexpected 
economic loss associated with yield loss for an individual farm operator is a function of 
not only the unexpected change in the operator's yield, but also the unexpected change in 
the value of the crop engendered by a wide-spread natural disaster or good weather. 
Unexpected economic loss can differ substantially between the free market and a 
market with farm price and income support programs. The reason is that unexpected 
changes in national yield can cause the value of the crop and deficiency payments to 
move in opposite directions. 
Empirical investigation of com yields for a sample of Ohio farm operators support 
these conceptual arguments. Furthermore, a comparison of insurance collected under 
current federal crop insurance programs with unexpected economic loss reveals (1) that 
the Group Risk Plan (GRP) payout structure is further removed from unexpected 
economic loss than Multiple Peril Crop Insurance's (MPCI) payout structure, (2) that 
MPCI tends to pay out more insurance than the associated unexpected economic loss in 
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he free market scenario, and (3) that MPCI more closely matches unexpected economic 
oss in the fann program scenario than in the free market scenario. Reflecting the last 
:wo findings, actuarial breakeven cost of compensating for unexpected economic loss 
resulting from yield variation was nearly identical to the bre&ceven cost of MPCI in the 
farm program scenario but 40 - 50 percent cheaper than the breakeven cost of MPCI in 
the free market. 
These results and conclusions only apply to Ohio corn over four years. 
Therefore, the analysis needs to be expanded to other crops, years, and locations. 
Nevertheless, the analysis points to several implications for crop insurance. 
Because GRP's payout structure is further removed from unexpected economic 
loss than MPCI' s payout structure, farm operators probably will perceive it as unfair 
relative to MPCI, and thus be reluctant to purchase it. 
While its payout structure should be modified to more closely match unexpected 
economic loss, MPCI currently provides a reasonable risk management tool for crops 
eligible for price and income support payments. However, a new MPCI contract should 
be designed to account for the different unexpected economic loss situation faced by 
crops which do not have farm support programs. Consistent with unexpected economic 
loss from yield variation in a free market, the new contract should base collections upon 
differences between percent unexpected change in national yield and individual operator's 
yield relative to yield expected at planting. 
This proposed version of MPCI can be launched by requiring that insurance can 
be collected only when the farm operator experiences an unexpected yield decline which 
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~ 25 percent (or some other number) more than the unexpected change in national yield. 
1or example, assume reali'U:d U.S. yield is 10 percent less than expected average U.S. 
rield at planting time. Thus, for an operator to collect insurance, his/her realized yield 
nust be 35 percent or more below expected yield at planting. This insurance contract 
lSSumes a price change coefficient of 1.0. While the true price change coefficient is not 
mown, a value of 1. 0 is close to the value empirically estimated in this paper. 
The new MPCI contract should create a fairer and cheaper insurance program for 
crops which have no farm support programs. Consequently, participation should 
increase, government subsidies should decline, and the need for .aQ. ~ disaster insurance 
should diminish. Note that these crops include soybeans in most years as well as flex 
acres of crops which have deficiency payment programs. 
A last implication is that crop insurance based on unexpected economic loss 
should reduce the incidence of market failure from an insurance perspective. The reason 
is that the market failure factor, i.e. widespread decline in yield over a large area, is 
incorporated into the insurance contract. Consequently, the possibility for successful 
private insurance should increase. This implication needs further exploration. 
ENDNOTES 
. A farm operator can sell crops in the cash market either at or after harvest. 
iowever, any change in cash price after harvest is a return to storage, not a return to 
,lanting the crop. Risks associated with storage are not part of the risk associated with 
>roducti.on, and thus should be insured separately. 
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Z. Beginning with the 1991 crop year, 15 percent of the acreage base is designated as 
flexible acres. Flexible acres can be planted to any crop except fruits and vegetables. 
Crops planted on flexible acres are eligible for price support loans (if available), but can 
not receive deficiency payments (USDA, June 1991, p. 35). 
3. It is important to note that this analysis focuses only on the variability in income due 
to the variability in yield. Income can vary for reasons other than yield variability. 
Hence, this analysis is not concerned with revenue insurance, but with insuring revenue 
variation arising only from yield variation. 
4. Survey respondents were asked for 1991 payment yield and 1991 expected yield only 
on land which they owned. In contrast, yield reported for 1986, 1987, 1988, and 1990 
was the average for all the farm operator's land, both owned and rented. Since farm 
operators tend to rent land in the same local in which they own land, a high correlation is 
likely to exist between yields on owned and rented land. To examine the validity of this 
assumption, an analysis was conducted using the 28 farm operators who only owned land 
in all four years. The results were similar. 
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5. A trend-line projection based on yields for the previous 10 years was also used. 
Results for tbe two methods were similar for 1986, 1987, and 1988, but differed for 
1990. The drought-reduced yield of 1988 lowered the trend-line projection for 1990 to 
113.1 bushels per acre. Hence, the five year moving average was selected because its 
1990 yield was consistent with the upward trend in expected yields for the three previous 
years. The same trend-line projection method was also examined for Ohio's expected 
yield. Results and conclusions mirror those for the U.S. 
6. A correlation of 0.75 existed between percent change in new crop yield and percent 
change in estimated consumption of the new crop. Therefore, new crop consumption is 
not included in the regression. 
7. A sensitivity test of the price change coefficient was conducted. Specifically, the 
aggregate demand price flexibility for corn implied by the Food and Agricultural Policy 
Research Institute's (FAPRI) economic model was used (Westhoff,~~.). This price 
flexibility was derived as the weighted average demand elasticity for feed, food, gasohol, 
exports, and free stocks. The weighting factor was the number of bushels in each 
category during the model's base year of 1988/89. The derived FAPRI implied price 
flexibility equalled -3.32. Despite the large difference from the approximate -0.80 price 
change coefficient used in this paper, results were similar. 
8. As a sensitivity test, the actual Ohio cash basis during that year's harvest was used 
instead of the average basis for the five previous crops. Results were similar. 
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9. Despite relatively large differences between expected and reali:red national yields in 
1986 and 1987, the distribution of unexpected gross revenue change in the farm program 
scenario does not mirror the distribution of unexpected yield changes more closely than 
does the distribution of unexpected gross revenue change in the free market scenario. 
This observation differs from that for 1988 largely because expected and reali:red per 
bushel deficiency payment were at their maximum value in 1986 and 1987. Hence, the 
decline in market value of com caused by the unexpected increase in national yield could 
not be offset by an unexpectedly higher deficiency payment. 
10. If farm specific records are not available, APH yield is calculated using county 
average yields (Lovell and Benson, p. 1). 
11. The 1993/94 target price of $2.75 and loan rate of $1.72 is also used for all four 
years in place of the contemporaneous loan rate and target price for each year. 
Breakeven cost for yield revenue insurance in the deficiency payment scenarios are 
$11.40 and $23.48 at the 25 and 10 percent deductible, respectively. 
12. Further analysis reveals that it is the deficiency payment and not the nonrecourse 
loan which increases the variability of crop income relative to the variability in a free 
market. This finding provides insight into a question which has puzzled policy analysts: 
Why did disaster insurance emerge as a major farm policy issue in the mid-1970's? 
Specifically, the advent of deficiency payments in 1973 increased the variability of crop 
income, and thus the need for crop insurance. 
TABLE 1. PERCENT DIFFER.ENCE BETWEEN AcmAL AND EXPECTED CORN YIELDS FOR FARM OPERATORS BY YEAR, 
Omo, 1986, 1987, 1988, AND 1990 
PERCENT CHANGE IN YmLD PROM THAT EXPECTED AT PLANTING•·• 
YEAR < -25% 1 -10.1 to -25% 1 -10% too 1 0 to 10% J 10.1 to 25% I > 25% I Total 
---------------------------Percent of Farm Operators --------------------------
1986 0.0 5.1 4.2 17.8 40.7 32.2 100 
1987 6.8 16.1 19.5 30.5 19.5 7.6 100 
1988 69.5 23.7 5.1 1.7 0.0 0.0 100 
1990 3.4 12.7 41.5 28.0 13.6 0.8 100 
All Years 19.9 14.4 17.6 19.5 18.5 10.2 100 
• Calculated as actual yield divided by expected yield. 
11 There are 118 observations in tach year for a total of 472 observation over all four years. 
SOURCB: Ohio Farm Longitudinal Survey and Original Calculations 
N 
IJ1 
TABLE 2. PERCENT UNEXPECTED CHANGE IN GROSS REVENUE roR FARM OPERATORS REsuL11NG FROM 
YIELD VARIATION BY YEAR, Omo CORN PRooocnoN, 1986, 1987, 1988, AND 1990 
PERCENT UNEXPECTED CHANGE IN GROSS REVENUE• 
MARKET SCENARIO -10.1 to- -10% to 0 to 10.1 to 
BY YEAR. < -25% 25% 0 10% 25% > 25% Total 
fa Market ----------------------------Percent of Farm Operators --------------------------
1986 0.8 5.9 13.6 33.1 28.8 17.8 100 
1987 10.2 21.2 32.2 20.3 12.7 3.4 100 
1988 37.3 19.5 12.7 11.0 16.1 3.4 100 
1990 3.4 13.6 42.4 27.1 12.7 0.8 100 
AUYtMS 12.9 15.1 25.2 22.9 17.6 6.4 100 
Fannfm&ram 
1986 0.0 0.8 8.5 32.2 44.1 14.4 100 
1987 0.0 14.4 28.0 39.0 17.0 1.7 100 
1988 61.9 28.8 7.6 1.7 0.0 0.0 100 
1990 2.5 11.0 44.1 28.8 12.7 0.8 100 
All Years 16.1 13.8 22.1 25.4 18.5 4.2 100 
• There are 118 observations in each year for a total of 472 observation over all four years. 
SOURCE: Ohio Farm Longitudinal Survey and Original Calculations 
N 
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TABLE 3. RELA110NSRIP BETWEEN UNEXPECTED EcONOMIC Loss RHSUL11NG FROM YIELD VARIA110N AND INsuRANCE 
COlLECTED, FREE MARKET AND FARM PROGRAM SCENARIOS, Omo CoRN, 1986, 1~7, 1981, AND 1990. 
FBDBRAL CROP INSURANCE! PROORAM BY SCENARIO 
MULTlPLB PBRIL (25%)' GROUP RISK PLAN (10%)• 
FRBE FARM FRBE FARM 
FARM OPERATOR SITUATION MARKBT PROORAM MARKBT PROORAM 
Insurance Collected (No. of Observations) 93 93 133 133 
Unexpected Economic Loss < Deductible 
Percent of Observations 40.86% 18.28% 39.10% 12.03% 
Average Insurance Collected $25.79 $10.55 $49.92 $27.52 
Unexpected Economic Loss > Deductible 
Percent of Observations 59.14% 81.72% 60.90% 87.97% 
Average Insurance Collected $67.27 $58.73 $58.84 $59.16 
Average Unexpected Economic Loss > Deductible $39.73 $65.56 $57.01 $86.65 
Insurance Not Collected (No. of Observations) 379 379 339 339 
Percent whose Unexpected Economic Loss > Deductible 1.58% 0.()()% 15.04% 7.08% 
Average Unexpected Economic Loss > Deductible $4.63 $0.00 $21.26 $21.93 
• Percent deductible 
SOURCE: Ohio Farm Longitudinal Survey and Original Calculations 
N 
-.) 
TABLE 4. BREAKEVEN AC'IlJARIAL COST AND GROSS INCOME VARIABILITY UNDER ALTERNA11VE CROP INsuRANCE 
PROGRAMS, FREE MARKET AND FARM PROGRAM SCENARIOS, Omo CORN, 1986, 1987, 1988, AND 1990. 
FREE MARKET SCENARIO FARM PROORAM ScENARIO 
AcTUARIAL AVERAGE STANDARD ACTUARIAL A VBRAOE STANDARD 
INSURANCE PROORAM CosT DEVIATION OF GROSS INCOME COST DEVIATION OF GROSS INCOME 
-----------------~----------------- $ I Acre ---------------------------------
No Insurance NA• 42.29 NA• 52.00 
MPCI 
10% Deductible 19.62 37.13 19.62 23.79 
2S% Deductible 9.84 33.36 9.84 3S.14 
ORP 
10% Deductible 15.60 43.16 15.60 34.70 
2S% Deductible 6.21 39.88 6.21 42.41 
Yield Revenue 
10% Deductible 12.08 31.06 22.59 22.13 
25% Deductible 4.69 35.82 10.56 33.88 
• Not Applicable 
SOURCE: Ohio Farm Longitudinal Survey and Original Calculations 
N 
00 
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